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Waddams: The Case of Grace James (1827)

THE CASE OF GRACE JAMES (1827)
Stephen Waddamst
Abstract: In 1827, Lord Stowell, the judge of the High Court of Admiralty,
was called upon to decide a controversial appeal from the Vice-Admiralty
Court of Antigua. The issue was whether a person who had been a slave in
Antigua, having resided in England for a period of time, reverted to a condition of slavery on returning to Antigua. Lord Stowell's decision, putting a
restrictive interpretationon Lord Mansfield's celebrated decision in Sommersett's Case, was that the condition of slavery, though not recognized in England, revived on the former slave's return to Antigua. Lord Stowell's
decision, usually referred to as the Slave, Grace, the name given to it in Haggard's Reports, soon became obsolete in British jurisdictions, but was influential for a longer period in the United States. The background documents
reveal a number of important circumstances not apparentfrom a reading of
the law report. The documents show that there was considerable anti-slavery
sentiment among some of the officers of the Crown in Antigua and also in
London. The law report states that Grace was "seized" by the customs officials, but the documents show that it was she who initiated the process, claiming protection from the customs officials in order to have her "right of
freedom judicially declared and solemnly determined." The procedure had
been used for this purpose in previous instances, and the dispute was perceived, both in Antigua and in London, as an important test case. The interests
of the Crown, the anti-slavery movement, and Grace James herself were thus
aligned in this case, which was strenuously argued for the Crown by Dr. Stephen Lushington, a leading member of the Anti-Slavery Society, well-known
for his forceful anti-slavery sentiments.

Lord Mansfield's decision in Sommersett's Case (1772) established
that the condition of slavery could not be enforced in England, but it
did not clearly declare that a former slave, on reaching England, became permanently free for all purposes. Thus, it remained uncertain
whether a former slave, having resided in England, who later returned
to a jurisdiction where slavery was recognized, reverted to a condition
of slavery.
In 1827, this question arose in the case reported as The Slave,
Grace,1 decided by Lord Stowell in the English High Court of Admiralty on appeal from the Vice-Admiralty Court of Antigua. This was
almost Lord Stowell's last case; his retirement, at the age of 82, was
announced three days after delivery of the judgment, and he actually
retired the following February.2 The facts of the case were that a
slave, Grace James, had traveled with her mistress from Antigua to
England in 1822 and returned to Antigua in the following year. Later
she was "seized" by a customs officer on the ground that her owner
had brought her into Antigua without proper documentation. It was
t Goodman/Schipper Professor of Law and University Professor, University of
Toronto.
1. The Slave, Grace (1827) 2 Hagg 94, 2 St Tr (NS) 273.
2. The Times, 10 Nov 1827, 2b, Henry J Bourgignon, Sir William Scott, Lord
Stowell, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987.
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argued by the Crown, in answer to the owner's claim for restitution of
Grace James, that she was not a slave at all, but a free woman. Stoweli's decision was that James reverted to a condition of slavery on her
return to Antigua. An examination of the circumstances surrounding
this decision reveals several interesting features not apparent from a
reading of the law report.
The case was perceived, both in Antigua and in London, as a test
case on an important matter of principle, and one that had far-reaching, practical implications. Several other cases from Antigua raising
the same point were also before Lord Stowell and were determined
according to the decision in the Grace James case. 3 The acting governor of Antigua, writing to Lord Bathurst, the Colonial Secretary, in
September 1825, said that "these seizures appeared to me of a novel
nature, and more than likely to involve to a great extent the interest
and rights of many individuals, not only in this, but in all the other
British West India islands, as regards their legal property in slaves."
He added that "if such a measure, now for the first time agitated, be
permitted, or allowed to be proceeded in, it is impossible to calculate
or foresee the evil and mischievous consequences that must and will
result, by the adoption of a principle, pernicious in the extreme, to
every colonist similarly circumstanced. It must, I humbly presume, be
evident to your Lordship, that no proprietor resident in the West Indies, when either public or private business called him to England,
would have run the risk of taking with him one or more of his slaves as
domestic servants, could he have foreseen or contemplated that, in
doing so, he would forfeit all right and title in them upon their return." He concluded by saying that this was a matter "which has not a
little roused the feelings of the inhabitants of this island." 4
The procedural background to the dispute is important and clearly
influenced Lord Stowell. The law report states that in 1825 Grace was
"seized" by a customs officer at Antigua on the ground of having been
brought into the country without proper documents in 1823. This process occurred under an 1819 statute principally designed to control the
inter-colonial transfer of slaves. The penalty for importing a slave
without the proper documents was forfeiture of the slave to the
Crown. As Lord Stowell pointed out, this was a peculiar framework
for determination of whether a free person had been wrongly treated
as a slave. A process designed to induce compliance with registration
requirements by threat of forfeiture of property was being used for an
entirely different purpose, viz to determine a claim of emancipation.
But litigants use what legal tools are available, and it often happens
that important principles come to be determined in the context of a
3. Cases of William Otto, William Robday, John Smith, Rachel, and Jack Martin.
The Times, 14 Nov 3e, 22 Nov. 3e, 10 Dec. 2f.
4. Samuel Athill to Earl Bathurst, September 2, 1825, British Parliamentary Papers [PP] 1826 xxvi 413.
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legal framework very poorly suited to discussion of the principle.
Lord Stowell suggested that the proper process for a free person to
use would have been an action for damages: "What has he to do but to
bring his action against the defamer of his rights, and who can doubt
but that he would recover most overwhelming damages against the
person who had assaulted his freedom, and compelled him to submit
to a process that is only applicable to a slave, and to pour upon his
gross wrongdoer the whole vengeance of the law?" 5
It is probable that the reason why no direct claim was made by
Grace, for example an action for damages for wrongful detention, or
for habeas corpus, was that the common law courts of Antigua were
known to be hostile to such claims. Richard Musgrave, the Antigua
solicitor-general, who was evidently the moving force behind the proceedings, complained that several of the judges were members of the
island's Privy Council who had, in effect, prejudged the issue:
It was moved by a member, Dr Coull, seconded by Mr Richard
Weston Newton (a judge of the Court of Common Pleas, thus making the fourth member of this bench by whom the question at issue
has been actually prejudged, viz; the right to freedom of persons
brought from England into the colonies as slaves; which he strenuously denied, and which had been already previously declared in the
resolution of the Privy Council, by Mr President Warner, Mr William Byam, and the Rev. S. W. Harman, three other judges of that
court, in their characters as members of the council, to be a doctrine
most dangerous to the interests of the colony.6
Musgrave later mentioned that the Court of Common Pleas consisted
of five judges in total and was the court that dealt with applications for
habeas corpus. Lord Stowell had this document before him. He was,
of course, entitled to point out the anomalous nature of the forfeiture
proceedings, but he lays himself open to observation when he suggests
that an action for damages would have been a realistic alternative.
Among the papers is the petition of Grace James herself:
To the Right Honourable Henry Earl Bathurst, K.G., His Majesty's
Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies.
The humble petition of Grace James, a free woman of colour of the
Island of Antigua.
Sheweth, That your petitioner accompanied her mistress, Mrs John
Allen, of this island, to London, as her slave, in the year 1822, and
remained with her during her stay in England:
That when her mistress was about to return to this island, she was
induced to accompany her as a servant, considering that by her residence in England she had acquired a right to freedom which had
been vested in her, and relying upon the positive promise of her
mistress that she should ever after be considered as free:
5. The Slave, supra note 1, at 102 (Hagg), 277 (St Tr).
6. Musgrave to Bathurst, 31 August 1825, PP 1826 xxvi 424.
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That the embarked in the ship Killinbeck of London, and landed in
the island of Antigua in January 1823, without observing such forms
as the Abolition Acts require in removing slaves from one British
territory to another; that she remained with her mistress as a free
person until a short time since, when having the misfortune to offend her for a trifling cause, she was publicly flogged by her mistress's order, on the estate, and told that she was still a slave; that
soon after your petitioner applied to an officer of His Majesty's
Customs in this island, and claimed his protection under the laws
regulating the importation of slaves; that her case was by him laid
before the Honourable Richard Musgrave, the Procurator-General,
who was of opinion that she was liable to forfeiture to the use of His
Majesty, as having been illegally imported and dealt with as a slave;
that in consequence the officer made seizure of her, delivered her to
the care of the Collector, and caused her to be libelled in the ViceAdmiralty court under the consolidated slave law. That proceedings under the several clauses of the different acts of parliament
were in the usual train, when her mistress, Mrs Allan, set forth the
case in a memorial to the Honourable Samuel Athill, the Commander-in-Chief, in the absence of the Governor, who by the advice
of his council, gave directions to the Crown-officer to stay proceedings until the pleasure of His Majesty's government should be
known; that your petitioner is satisfied that there is no local law in
usage by which she can be divested of that right to the enjoyment of
her freedom which she has vested in her, and which she acquired by
the acts, and with the assent of her mistress, who now seeks to establish the slavery of your petitioner.
Your petitioner begs leave to remark that three other slaves, named
Ellen Christian and her child Sam, and Richard Daniel, have been
recently seized under similar circumstances by the Collector of His
Majesty's Customs at this island, and condemned by the Judge of
the Vice-Admiralty Court, thereby having their right of freedom judicially decided and solemnly determined; and your petitioner being
fearful if some measures are not taken to prevent it, that she may be
returned to her mistress, whose angry feelings may lead her to acts
of severity and violence, humbly presumes to pray that your lordship will take the extreme hardship of her case into your consideration, and extend to your petitioner the same advantage that others,
under similar circumstances, are now quietly enjoying, or grant her
such relief as to you wisdom may seem fit: And, as in duty bound,
your petitioner will ever pray,
Antigua,
August 31st, 1825
Grace James
The within named Grace James made her cross, or mark, in my
presence
(signed) Nathaniel Hill7

7. Id. at 422.
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This petition was probably drafted by Richard Musgrave; it bears
the same date as the covering letter enclosing it to Lord Bathurst and
restates some of the legal arguments included in that letter. Musgrave's role in the matter is one of the most interesting features of the
case. He evidently held strong anti-slavery sentiments and was willing
to press them to the point of incurring the strong disapproval of the
Antigua government and of the colonists. In a long letter to the Collector and Controller of Customs in Antigua, Musgrave set out the
arguments he proposed to make to the Vice-Admiralty Court. In the
course of the letter he spoke of "the very absurd principle that persons can be brought from England where slavery does not exist, nor is
at all tolerated, in the character of slaves, and be afterwards dealt with
and treated as such in the colonies."' He spoke of a "virtual release
from the yoke of slavery" and expressed the hope that "the totally
erroneous principle formerly upheld in these colonies might gradually
give place to a more liberal construction and interpretation of British
law on the subject of personal liberty, in every civilized country under
His Majesty's dominion." 9 Musgrave complained that he had been
threatened with imprisonment and suspension from office and been
forced to resign from the House of Assembly. He was, he said, a West
Indian by birth and a proprietor of a West India sugar estate, who had
lived in Antigua for 13 years.10 He had nothing to gain from his course
of action, personally or professionally, and much to lose.
Equally interesting is the role played by the customs officers, who
evidently saw it as part of their duties to vindicate, through the process of "seizure," claims of persons wrongly treated as slaves. In her
petition, Grace James makes it clear that several other persons had
successfully used this procedure to vindicate their claim to freedom.
In a letter to Musgrave of 16 April 1825, George Wyke, the Collector
of Customs wrote:
The bearer, "Richard Daniel", came to me about three weeks ago
to claim my protection, under nearly similar circumstances with the
mulatto woman "Nelly Christian" who, with her child (born since
her return to this island) I seized under the Abolition Act and for
whose benefit you are about to institute proceedings in the Court of
Vice-Admiralty. The only difference in the case of the present person to that of the woman in question is, as to time of return to this
country, and which, at the period of the man's first coming to claim
my protection, I thought did not entitle him to my interference to
obtain his liberation from slavery, and I then hastily dismissed him,
and desired him to return to his owner. But upon reflection since, it
has occurred to me, that where so momentous a point as the liberty
of the subject is concerned, I should be derelicting from my duty,
did I not avail myself of the assistance of His Majesty's law officer
8. PP 1826 xxvi, 427.
9. Id. at 429-30.
10. Id. at 447-48.
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[i.e., Musgrave], where a doubt existed in my mind ....I think it

right to state that I felt it my duty to send for this man, in order that
he might have the benefit of telling his own story to you. 1
This indicates a high degree of anti-slavery sympathy and shows a
close co-operation between the customs officers and the solicitor-general. In another letter to the Colonial, Officer Wyke explained the
situation by saying, "These slaves having gone to England with their
masters and mistresses, where they remained some time (and where of
course they must have been considered free persons) have lately
called upon the officers of this department to claim their emancipation; and although it appeared to us to be a good ground for restoring
these persons again to freedom, 'their having once enjoyed the full
rights of British subjects' yet we considered that it might moot a question in these islands which would occasion great discontent on this
side of the water .. ."'I This is a way of putting the question that is
very sympathetic to Grace James's claim.
Wyke was, of course, correct in saying that the colonists were discontented with the actions of Musgrave and of the customs officers.
Athill, the acting governor, peremptorily stayed the proceedings in the
Vice-Admiralty court and wrote to London for instructions. Bathurst's reply, dated 21 January 1826, refers to "a petition addressed to
me by Grace James, a free woman of colour." She is referred to respectfully by her full name, and there are no quotation marks in the
original document round the phrase "free woman of colour." Bathurst continues:
I have to inform you, that it will be expedient for you to withdraw
those prohibitions which with the advice of your Council you have
instituted against the proceedings in the Vice-Admiralty
Court ....That court is a tribunal before which, according to the

law, these prosecutions must in the first instance be tried, and if the
decision of the Vice-Admiralty Court be questionable, the law has
provided an appeal to the High Court of Admiralty in England. I
deeply regret that you were induced to stay proceedings on those
questions, but I am at the same time ready to admit that you have to
plead the unanimous opinion of your Council, to which, as you were
acting only in the temporary administration of the government, you
might think yourself more particularly bound to conform; and I cannot by any means approve of the unbecoming manner in which the
Solicitor-General thought proper to address you in the course of the
correspondence. But you ought to have recollected that in staying
these proceedings you were suspending by your own authority the
course of justice as by law directed to be administered; that on a
decision on these proceedings, the liberty of your fellow creatures
eventually depended; that it was far from being clear that the ab11. Id. at 449.
12. Wyke to Robert Wilmot Horton, colonial under-secretary, 30 August 1835, id.
at 449-50.
788
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stract question, from the decision on which by the Vice-Admiralty
Court you and your council apprehended so much danger, was necessarily involved; and that if it were so, it was in truth a decision of
right, on which it was not for the Secretary of State, but for the law
to decide. Whether a slave having arrived in this country, and voluntarily returning to the West Indies, without misapprehension or
fraud, be or be not to be dealt with there as a slave, is a question on
which no legal decision has, I understand, hitherto been taken. But
if in the course of these proceedings such a question should arise
(and by these papers it is by no means clear that it will) you will
cause an appeal to be brought before the High Court of Admiralty
in this country, whatever may be the decision of the Vice-Admiralty
Court in Antigua. It is fit that so grave a question should be
pleaded by the eminent civilians [i.e., civil lawyers] in this country,
Stowell, the most distinguished
and a decision pronounced by Lord
13
judge that ever sat in that court.
The phrasing of this letter shows very strong anti-slavery sympathy;
the reference to "the liberty of your fellow creatures" sounds like
something drafted in the office of the Anti-Slavery Society, rather
than in the Colonial Office. The letter, though recognizing mitigating
factors, amounts to a severe reprimand of Athill for interfering with
the regular course of legal proceedings.
The letter is significant also in showing a deliberate decision in the
Colonial Office to have this question authoritatively resolved, not
only for Antigua, but for the other British colonies. It is significant
that Athill was instructed to appeal whatever might be the outcome in
Antigua, showing that Bathurst anticipated that the Antigua court
might decide against James's claim to freedom and suggesting that
Bathurst expected that she might expect a more favourable hearing
from Lord Stowell.
On August 25, 1826, the judge of the Antigua court decreed, as reported by Haggard, "that the woman Grace be restored to the claimant [i.e., Allen] with costs and damages for her detention." 4 The
Crown appealed, and the case was argued before Lord Stowell in June
and July, 1827. The case for the appellants was argued by Sir Christopher Robinson, the King's Advocate, soon to succeed Lord Stowell as
Admiralty court judge and Dr Stephen Lushington, a leading figure in
the British anti-slavery movement. The interests of the Crown, the
anti-slavery movement, and of Grace James herself were thus aligned
in this case. Although formally, as mentioned earlier, the dispute was
between the claimant (Allen) and the Crown over a question of forfeiture of property; in substance it was, and was perceived to be, a claim
for freedom by Grace James. The Times reporter wrote, in introducing the account of Lushington's speech, "Dr Lushington was heard
13. Id. at 450-51.
14. The Slave, supra note 1, at 95 (Hagg).
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this day, on behalf of the appellant (the slave) in this important
case."' 15 Formally this statement was wrong (the appellant was the
Crown, not James), but in substance it was true.
Lushington's speech was described by the Times reporter as "most
elaborate, argumentative, and powerful." In summary, his argument
was that English law prevailed in Antigua except where expressly altered by statute; slavery was not recognized by English law; James had
left England and entered Antigua in 1823 as a free woman; and there
was no statute, either in England or Antigua, that expressly deprived
her of her freedom. As earlier mentioned, the argument failed. Lord
Stowell said that "I am sorry that it has fallen to my share to determine so great a question,"16 and there is no need to doubt his sincerity
on this point: the issue was far removed from the questions of ecclesiastical and admiralty law that had formed the substance of Stowell's
career. His judgment, given on November 6, dismissed the Crown appeal and affirmed the sentence of the Antigua court. In substance,
Stowell's reasons were that, slavery being admittedly recognized as
lawful in Antigua, and Grace James having admittedly been a slave
until 1822, the burden lay on the Crown to show that, by the law of
Antigua, she had gained her freedom. Reform of the law relating to
slavery was for parliament, and it was not for Stowell, as a judge, to
seek to make incremental reforms: "It may be a misfortune that she
was a slave; but, being so, she, in the present constitution of society,
had no right to be treated otherwise." 17
Stowell's intense discomfort with the decision is shown in the newspaper report of the companion cases, decided in December, 1827.
Stowell is reported as saying,
I have now finished the review of the cases brought before me. I
have discharged them to the satisfaction of my own conscience,
thought not perhaps satisfactorily to others: that I cannot help. It is
a duty incumbent upon me to remind the parties who bring forward
these prosecutions, that it is a matter which requires considerable
caution, and more than they happen to have shown in these particular cases. I am unwilling to dwell upon the subject, and I impute no
improper motives; they have been1 8misled by their own views in proceeding to the extent they have.
Stowell then expressed satisfaction that the cases were concluded, but
Dr. Dodson (the advocate for the claimants) stated that another question remained whether the slaves or their value were to be restored.
Stowell responded, with a degree of irritation rarely heard in the tranquil hall of Doctors' Commons, "Don't let me have any more questions, I beg." This shows that Stowell was near the end of his tether,
15.
16.
17.
18.

The Times, 27 June 1827, 3e.
Id. 25 July, 3e.
The Slave, supra note 1, at 99-100 (Hagg), 275 (St Tr).
The Times 10 Dec. 3a.
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but it was probably as well for the interests of Grace James, as we
shall see, that this question fell to be determined by Stowell's
successor.
Stowell's decision was praised by The Times in a leading article on
the ground that England had profited from the institution of slavery
and should be prepared to pay compensation to slave-owners if slavery were to be abolished.' 9 This line of argument foreshadows the
political compromise that facilitated the passage of the Slavery Abolition Act six years later. The Times said also that an appeal was expected,2 0 but none was made, probably because the Crown's advisers
thought that the appellate court (the High Court of Delegates, or the
Prize Appeal Court 21 ) was unlikely to reverse the decision and that,
even if it did, it would establish no useful precedent because the court
was constituted anew for each appeal and gave no reasons for its decisions. Lushington, not surprisingly, continued to oppose the substance of the decision. In the debates preliminary to the 1833 Act, he
proposed to reverse the decision by specific legislation. Having described the decision, he said, "I am compelled . . . to admit, on the
authority of my Lord Stowell, that such is the present iniquitous state
of the law; and though I am compelled to submit to Lord Stowell's
high legal authority, I cannot forbear from expressing my abomination
of law so unjust. I admit, I say, the doctrine, coming as it does from so
distinguished an authority; but I take the liberty of asserting that as I
reprobate the injustice of such a principle of law, so I do not, for my
22
own part, agree to the doctrine laid down.
Stowell himself was sensitive to criticisms of his judgment. In January, 1828, he wrote to the American scholar and judge, Joseph Story,
for moral support. Having explained the legal issue, he wrote that
"this question had never been examined since an end was put to slavery in England fifty years ago; but the practice has regularly been, that
in his return to his country the slave resumed his original character of
slave." He added that the case "has occasioned a good deal of attention and noise in England" and that it and the other related cases
"have cost me a great deal of trouble and anxiety. '23 Not receiving a
prompt answer, he wrote again in May, rather anxiously and
defensively:
I desire to be understood as not at all deciding the question upon
the lawfulness of the slave trade, upon which I am rather a stern
Abolitionist, but merely this narrow question, whether the Court of
19. The Times, 8 November 1827, 2c.
20. Id. 10 November 1827, 2b.
21. On the relationship between these courts, see G.I.O.DUNCAN, THE HIGH
COURT OF DELEGATES

79-80 (1971).

22. Mirror of Parliament 1833, 3324a (25 July).
23. Stowell to Joseph Story, 9 January 1828, W.W. Story, Life and Letters of Joseph Story, Little and Brown, Boston, 1851, 2 vols, ii, 553.
M
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King's Bench, in the case of Sommersett, meant to declare that our
non-execution of the slave code in England was a new suspension of
it as respected England, but left it in full operation with respect to
the colonies - which some of our Abolitionists here and some of our
judges there resolutely contend for. My clear opinion is for its limited effect. The execution of the Code laws is suspended in England, as being thought inconsistent with the nature as well as the
institutions of this country. So far it goes, but no farther, it does not
at all derogate from the law of the colonies upon the return of the
person so far liberated in England, but left exposed to the severity
of the law in the colonies, upon the return of the party so partially
liberated here; this is the whole of the question which I had occasion
to consider, and it is a question which has nothing to do with the
general legality of the slave trade in the colonies .... I am a friend to
abolition generally, but I wish it to be effected with justice to individuals. Our Parliaments have long recognized it and have not only
invited, but actually compelled our colonists to adopt it, and how,
under such circumstances, it is to be broken up at the sloe expense
of the colonist, I cannot see consistent with either common reason
or common justice; it must be done at the common expense of both
countries; and upon that part of the case very great difficulties exist.
Our zealots are for leaping over them all, but in that disposition I
cannot hold them to be within the wise or just part of this nation.2 4
In September, Story replied:
I have read with great attention your judgment in the Slave Case
from the Vice-Admiralty Court of Antigua. Upon the fullest consideration, which I have been able to give to the subject, I entirely
concur in your views. If I had been called upon to pronounce a
judgment in a like case, I should certainly have arrived at the same
result, though I might not have been able to present the reasons
which lead to it in such a striking and convincing manner. It appears
to me that the decision is impregnable. In my native state, (Massachusetts,) the state of slavery is not recognized as legal; and yet, if a
slave should come hither, and afterwards return to his own home,
we should certainly think that the local law would re-attach upon
him, and that his servile character would be reintegrated. I have
had occasion to know that your judgment has been extensively read
in America (where questions of this nature are not of unfrequent
[sic.] discussion) and I never have heard any other opinion but that
of approbation of it expressed among the profession of the Law.25
Stowell's letters show that, as he saw the case, he thought that he was
being pressed by "zealots" (among whom, no doubt, he would have
included Lushington) to depart from settled practice, with consequences that he thought would be unjust to slave owners. Story's reply must have been of some comfort to him, as public opinion in
24. Stowell to Joseph Story, 17 May 1828, W.W. Story, Life and Letters of Joseph
Story, Little and Brown, Boston, 1851, 2 vols, ii, 555.
25. Story to Stowell, 22 Sept 1828, id. at 558.
792

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol13/iss2/24
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V13.I2.23

10

Waddams: The Case of Grace James (1827)

2007]

THE CASE OF GRACE JAMES

England began to turn decisively against slavery. As Story's letter
shows, the issue remained relevant in the United States, where Stoweli's judgment continued to be cited, notably in the Dred Scott case
(1853).
As mentioned earlier, Lord Stowell refused to decide the question
of whether the successful claimants were entitled to actual possession
of the slaves or only to money compensation. In March, 1828, the
case of Grace James came back to the High Court of Admiralty on
this question. 26 Robinson, who had argued the case for the Crown,
had now succeeded Stowell as admiralty court judge. His decision was
that the claimant was entitled to a money payment only. It appears
from this decision that Allen claimed actual possession of Grace and
that the Crown successfully disputed the claim, a course of action that
is difficult to explain except by the supposition of concern in the Colonial Office for James's personal welfare. It would have been an exceptional hardship, after being treated as a free person for nearly three
years while the litigation was pending, for her to be returned into the
actual power of an owner who had allegedly treated her with cruelty,
and who had reason to blame her for the litigation. Thus, though
Grace James did not obtain a declaration of her freedom, she may, in
the end, have secured a significant part of the practical result that she
had desired.
26. The Times, 13 March 1828, 4a.
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